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fix(secrets): honor ops.secrets.read permission for reveal/list

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A regular member granted reveal access either via the ops.secrets.read
role permission or a per-secret ops_acl entry could not actually see or
reveal secrets: revealSecret hard-gated on built-in role admin/board
(ignoring both the permission and the ACL), and secrets_select RLS never
consulted the permission, and the Ops page short-circuited the secrets
fetch by built-in role.

Migration 031 additively adds an OR user_has_permission(...,
'ops.secrets.read') branch to secrets_select; the admin/board and
per-secret ops_acl branches are unchanged so deployment is access-neutral
unless an admin has granted the permission. revealSecret now resolves
the member and lets RLS be the boundary (a denied row simply does not
return). The Ops page always queries secrets (RLS filters the set) and
shows the section to admin/board, a permission holder, or anyone with an
ACL-granted secret. Write paths (create/update/delete) are unchanged.
Mirrored in schema.sql; migration docs and HANDOFF updated.
This commit is contained in:
Moheeb Zara
2026-05-16 19:07:06 -07:00
parent b2ac0e0271
commit 2687c1578d
7 changed files with 74 additions and 15 deletions
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docs/DATABASE_SCHEMA.md
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@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ CREATE INDEX idx_activity_space ON activity_log(space_id, created_at);
---
## Migrations 014-030 (additions since the 13-table baseline)
## Migrations 014-031 (additions since the 13-table baseline)
`scripts/schema.sql` is the canonical idempotent schema; each numbered
migration is mirrored as a section in it. Tables/columns added:
@@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ migration is mirrored as a section in it. Tables/columns added:
| 028 | Form slug is unique PER SPACE: drops the global `UNIQUE(forms.slug)`, adds `UNIQUE(space_id, slug)`. Public form URL is `/f/[space]/[slug]` |
| 029 | `space_invites.role` (member_role enum, default `member`) so an invite can grant a chosen role; legacy invites and the spaces.invite_code path keep granting `member`. Who may create an admin-granting invite is enforced in-app (only an admin) |
| 030 | `certifications` (per-space cert types; optional `validity_months`; `is_active` archive) + `member_certifications` (per-member grants; `expires_at` snapshotted at grant time; soft `revoked_at`/`revoked_by`; partial unique on one active grant per member+cert). RLS additive + default-deny: certifications SELECT = any space member, write = `certifications.manage`; member_certifications SELECT = `certifications.manage`/`certifications.grant` (all) or member (own), INSERT/UPDATE = `certifications.grant`, NO DELETE policy (history immutable). New `certifications.manage` + `certifications.grant` permissions (the latter = the Instructor capability) seeded to board + backfilled. No anonymous path |
| 031 | `secrets_select` additively also honors the `ops.secrets.read` role permission (was admin/board OR per-secret `ops_acl` only; the permission was never consulted). Access-neutral unless an admin has granted the permission. Reveal/list server-side gates updated to let RLS be the boundary; write paths unchanged |
New enum: `comment_entity_type` = `forum_thread | proposal | incident | policy`.
docs/HANDOFF.md
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@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ Built phase-by-phase, each gated (vitest + `pnpm build` read in-run) + its own c
### Open / not done
- Certifications is LOCAL (6 commits ahead). Awaiting deploy approval. After push: confirm `030` applied, board has both perms, exercise create-type -> grant -> revoke -> renew -> `/me` -> non-admin-instructor path; nothing is browser-verified (no live browser this session).
- Pure logic is unit-tested; action *orchestration* (RLS/visibility/grant uniqueness) is NOT (no Supabase mock harness — same systemic gap as forms).
- Queued by user, NOT yet started: (a) verify secrets reveal works via BOTH `ops.secrets.read` role perm AND direct `ops_acl` entry (read-only audit under the RLS guardrail); (b) KB + processes should render markdown with working in-document anchor links.
- Secrets-permission audit (user-requested) FOUND A REAL BUG and FIXED IT (user-approved, LOCAL): `revealSecret` hard-gated on built-in role `['admin','board']` and `secrets_select` never consulted `ops.secrets.read`, so the permission was inert and even an ACL-granted member was pre-blocked by the action; the Ops page also short-circuited the secrets fetch by built-in role. Fix (additive, guarded-surface, approved): migration `031` adds `OR user_has_permission(...,'ops.secrets.read')` to `secrets_select` (admin/board + per-secret `ops_acl` branches unchanged, access-neutral); `revealSecret` now `requireMember` + RLS-bounded read (RLS is the boundary); Ops page always queries secrets (RLS filters) and shows the section for admin/board OR the perm OR any ACL-returned row. Writes unchanged. Mirrored in schema.sql + migration docs. NOT browser-verified.
- Queued by user, NOT yet started: KB + processes should render markdown with working in-document anchor links.
- STILL OPEN: production incident-INSERT RLS bug — raised to user this pass; awaiting a prod retry to diagnose (#1 SSR auth.uid() vs #3 data drift). Do not touch the permissions/RLS surface without that diagnosis + approval.
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