fix(door): never return raw controller reason to the client (D10)

Every door action bubbled the executor's reason/e.message to the
client; redaction was password-literal + a fixed param-name regex, so a
generic-adapter connection with a custom auth param + verbose upstream
error could surface the secret client-side. Client returns are now a
generic 'controller call failed' message; the redacted detail still
goes to door_access_log for operators. redactDoorSecrets + callDoor
gained an optional authParam (scrub the connection's actual auth param
value regardless of name); threading conn.auth_param through the
door-call selects is a deferred defense-in-depth follow-up (client
leak is fully closed; native HeatSync e= is already regex-covered).
This commit is contained in:
Moheeb Zara
2026-05-18 18:44:54 -07:00
parent 785e8e0ef9
commit 66cb84bc57
3 changed files with 23 additions and 8 deletions
+3 -2
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ export async function callDoor(opts: {
url: string
pinnedHost: string
password?: string | null
authParam?: string | null
timeoutMs?: number
}): Promise<DoorCallResult> {
const guard = validateDoorTarget(opts.url, opts.pinnedHost)
@@ -57,11 +58,11 @@ export async function callDoor(opts: {
/* ignore */
}
}
const snippet = redactDoorSecrets(received.slice(0, SNIPPET), opts.password)
const snippet = redactDoorSecrets(received.slice(0, SNIPPET), opts.password, opts.authParam)
return { ok: res.ok, status: res.status, snippet }
} catch (e) {
const msg = e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'request failed'
return { ok: false, reason: redactDoorSecrets(msg, opts.password) }
return { ok: false, reason: redactDoorSecrets(msg, opts.password, opts.authParam) }
} finally {
clearTimeout(timer)
}