From 75097a601cc630e832d938945c2fa5c9d65b0a00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Moheeb Zara <hackbuildvideo@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 17 May 2026 04:54:11 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] feat(notifications): P2d dispatcher cron route

POST /api/cron/notifications drains <=20 pending rows/min, sends via the
transport with the row id as Resend Idempotency-Key (overlap-safe),
marks sent or increments attempts (retryable -> stay pending, permanent
or budget-exhausted -> failed). Constant-time CRON_SECRET bearer check;
503 when unset. ~4.5/s spacing under Resend's 5/s limit. proxy.ts
whitelists /api/cron (no session; own shared secret). CRON_SECRET added
to .env.example.
---
 .env.example                        |  5 ++
 app/api/cron/notifications/route.ts | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 proxy.ts                            |  3 +
 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 app/api/cron/notifications/route.ts

diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index 35b4099..9a59a8c 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ RESEND_API_KEY=
 # in Resend (SPF + DKIM) for production delivery. Friendly name optional.
 # Example: HeatSync Labs <noreply@hackerspace.sh>
 EMAIL_FROM=
+# Shared secret guarding the notification dispatcher (/api/cron/notifications).
+# The droplet's crontab POSTs with "Authorization: Bearer $CRON_SECRET" once a
+# minute. Unset = the dispatcher returns 503 and never sends. Generate with:
+# openssl rand -hex 32
+CRON_SECRET=
 
 # Docker build flag (only when building the standalone image)
 # Set to "1" in the Dockerfile so next.config.mjs emits standalone output.
diff --git a/app/api/cron/notifications/route.ts b/app/api/cron/notifications/route.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9519bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/api/cron/notifications/route.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// Notification dispatcher. Drains a bounded batch of pending outbox rows and
+// sends them via the email transport. Designed to be hit once a minute by the
+// droplet's crontab (see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md). Unauthenticated by session
+// (cron has none) so proxy.ts whitelists /api/cron; trust is the CRON_SECRET
+// shared-secret header, compared in constant time.
+//
+// Re-entrancy: a row is updated immediately after its own send, and sendEmail
+// passes the row id as Resend's Idempotency-Key, so an overlapping run cannot
+// double-send. Transient failures (retryable) stay pending for the next
+// minute until the attempt budget is exhausted; permanent ones go to 'failed'.
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server'
+import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto'
+import { createAdminClient } from '@/lib/supabase/admin'
+import { sendEmail } from '@/lib/email/send'
+import { isTerminalAttempt, MAX_NOTIFICATION_ATTEMPTS } from '@/lib/notifications-logic'
+
+export const runtime = 'nodejs'
+export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic'
+
+const BATCH = 20
+// ~4.5 sends/sec, under Resend's 5 req/sec team limit.
+const SPACING_MS = 220
+
+const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, ms))
+
+function authorized(req: NextRequest): boolean {
+  const expected = process.env.CRON_SECRET
+  if (!expected) return false
+  const header = req.headers.get('authorization') ?? ''
+  const provided = header.startsWith('Bearer ') ? header.slice(7) : header
+  const a = Buffer.from(provided)
+  const b = Buffer.from(expected)
+  return a.length === b.length && timingSafeEqual(a, b)
+}
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  if (!process.env.CRON_SECRET) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'CRON_SECRET not configured' }, { status: 503 })
+  }
+  if (!authorized(req)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })
+  }
+
+  const admin = createAdminClient()
+  const { data: rows, error } = await admin
+    .from('notifications')
+    .select('id, recipient, subject, body_html, body_text, attempts')
+    .eq('status', 'pending')
+    .eq('channel', 'email')
+    .lt('attempts', MAX_NOTIFICATION_ATTEMPTS)
+    .order('created_at', { ascending: true })
+    .limit(BATCH)
+
+  if (error) return NextResponse.json({ error: error.message }, { status: 500 })
+
+  let sent = 0
+  let failed = 0
+  let retried = 0
+
+  for (const row of rows ?? []) {
+    const res = await sendEmail({
+      to: row.recipient as string,
+      subject: row.subject as string,
+      html: row.body_html as string,
+      text: row.body_text as string,
+      idempotencyKey: row.id as string,
+    })
+
+    if (res.ok) {
+      await admin
+        .from('notifications')
+        .update({ status: 'sent', sent_at: new Date().toISOString(), last_error: null })
+        .eq('id', row.id)
+      sent++
+    } else {
+      const attempts = (row.attempts as number) + 1
+      const terminal = !res.retryable || isTerminalAttempt(attempts)
+      await admin
+        .from('notifications')
+        .update({
+          status: terminal ? 'failed' : 'pending',
+          attempts,
+          last_error: res.error,
+        })
+        .eq('id', row.id)
+      if (terminal) failed++
+      else retried++
+    }
+
+    if (SPACING_MS) await sleep(SPACING_MS)
+  }
+
+  return NextResponse.json({ scanned: rows?.length ?? 0, sent, failed, retried })
+}
diff --git a/proxy.ts b/proxy.ts
index 97c3c19..4a4737d 100644
--- a/proxy.ts
+++ b/proxy.ts
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ const PUBLIC_ROUTES = [
   // (Stripe does not follow redirects). Scoped to the webhook path only —
   // the Stripe server actions are invoked from authenticated pages.
   '/api/stripe/webhook',
+  // The notification dispatcher is hit by the droplet's crontab (no
+  // session); it enforces its own CRON_SECRET shared-secret header.
+  '/api/cron',
   // Public form / waiver fill page. Only /f/[slug] lives here and must be
   // reachable anonymously (the page serves only published public forms and
   // submitForm enforces visibility). The /forms* management routes do NOT