fix(security): Phase 3 post-deploy audit — 2 P0 + P1 + P2 (R5)
Independent adversarial audit verdict was NOT SAFE; fixed: - P0-1 /auth/confirm no longer trusts the query `type` (pinned to 'email_change'); a public endpoint feeding an attacker-chosen OTP type into verifyOtp was an unintended auth entrypoint. - P0-2 email sync uses the verifyOtp response user, not a follow-up getUser() that may not reflect the just-verified identity; /me now reconciles space_members.email against the authoritative auth email on load, so a missed sync self-heals (no permanent stale email). - P1-1 requestEmailChange builds the confirm origin from NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL only, never request headers (forged Host could redirect the confirmation link / capture token_hash). - P2-1 isSecretConfigField also catches password/token/private_key/ *_token/*_password so non-conventionally-named credentials can't be stored in plaintext integrations.config. 521 tests; build clean.
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { redirect } from 'next/navigation'
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import { createClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { createAdminClient } from '@/lib/supabase/admin'
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import { PageHeader, PageTitle } from '@/components/ui/page-title'
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import { PERMISSIONS, PERMISSION_CODES } from '@/lib/permissions-catalog'
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import { getMyClassSignups, getMyReservations, getMyCards, getMyVisits, getMyBilling, getMyNotifications, getMyPayments } from '@/lib/actions'
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@@ -33,6 +34,19 @@ export default async function MePage() {
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.maybeSingle()
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if (!member) redirect('/signup')
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// Self-heal: auth.users.email is authoritative (only changes after Supabase
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// confirmation). If the denormalized space_members.email drifted (e.g. the
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// /auth/confirm sync was missed because the second secure-change link was
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// opened in a different browser), reconcile it here on the owner's own row.
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if (user.email && member.email !== user.email) {
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await createAdminClient()
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.from('space_members')
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.update({ email: user.email })
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.eq('id', member.id)
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.eq('space_id', member.space_id)
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member.email = user.email
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}
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const profile = {
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email: (member.email as string | null) ?? '',
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display_name: (member.display_name as string | null) ?? '',
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+18
-12
@@ -5,35 +5,41 @@
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// the change applies to auth.users only after both links are verified; this
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// route is hit once per link and is idempotent.
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//
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// The denormalized space_members.email is synced to the authoritative
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// auth.users email ONLY here, after a successful verifyOtp — never at request
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// time (the user has not proven ownership yet).
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// This route does EXACTLY ONE thing: confirm an email change. The OTP type is
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// pinned to 'email_change' and the query `type` is intentionally ignored — a
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// public endpoint that fed an attacker-chosen type into verifyOtp would be an
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// unintended auth entrypoint (recovery/magiclink/signup tokens minting a
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// session here, bypassing their real flows).
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//
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// The denormalized space_members.email is synced from the verifyOtp response
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// user (NOT a follow-up getUser(), which is not guaranteed to reflect the
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// just-verified identity in this SSR request). /me additionally reconciles on
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// load, so a missed sync here self-heals.
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import { createClient } from '@/lib/supabase/server'
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import { createAdminClient } from '@/lib/supabase/admin'
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import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'
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import type { EmailOtpType } from '@supabase/supabase-js'
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export async function GET(request: Request) {
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const { searchParams, origin } = new URL(request.url)
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const tokenHash = searchParams.get('token_hash')
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const type = (searchParams.get('type') ?? 'email_change') as EmailOtpType
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if (!tokenHash) {
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return NextResponse.redirect(`${origin}/login?error=email_change`)
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}
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const supabase = await createClient()
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const { error } = await supabase.auth.verifyOtp({ type, token_hash: tokenHash })
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const { data, error } = await supabase.auth.verifyOtp({
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type: 'email_change',
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token_hash: tokenHash,
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})
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if (error) {
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return NextResponse.redirect(`${origin}/login?error=email_change`)
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}
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// Sync the denormalized copy to whatever auth.users now holds. On the first
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// of two secure-change links the email may still be the old one (no-op);
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// the second link's hit syncs it. Idempotent either way.
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const {
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data: { user },
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} = await supabase.auth.getUser()
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// Use the verifyOtp response user. On the first of two secure-change links
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// auth.users.email is still the old value (no-op sync); the second link's
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// hit carries the new email. Idempotent; /me reconciles any miss.
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const user = data.user
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if (user?.email) {
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await createAdminClient()
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.from('space_members')
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