Per-file type-only fixes surfaced after the Supabase client was correctly
typed. All fixes preserve runtime behavior; no any/ts-ignore/ts-expect-error.
- lib/supabase/client.ts: annotate the browser client as SupabaseClient<Database>
(same ssr/js drift as server.ts; fixes it centrally for all callers).
- Supabase embedded-select joins whose FK metadata is missing from the
generated types are bridged with `as unknown as <target>` + a TODO to remove
after regenerating types/database.ts.
- setState optimistic-update variance and raw <select> enum values cast to the
precise element/union type; .insert payload fields (Json, enums) given the
precise column type via satisfies/field casts.
- Added narrowing guards where a value was legitimately nullable (comms channel,
public form page) without changing the intended path.
The 14 remaining errors are confined to the four files fixed in Phase B (real
bugs + the tautological actions.test rewrite). 639 tests still green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 4 (migration 053): pull entry/denied events into door_access_log and
match each card to a member, via two transports sharing one ingest core.
Poll: a CRON_SECRET-guarded /api/cron/door-ingest reads each opted-in
native-HeatSync connection's ?z log through the existing hardened executor
and parses it (firmware-characterized, best-effort ring buffer). Webhook:
/api/door/inbound/[connection] accepts pushed event JSON authenticated by a
per-connection bearer secret from the vault. Both dedupe on
(connection_id, dedupe_key) so re-polls and retries are no-ops. Adds an
inbound config panel to /door/manage.
Phase 5 (migration 054): admins define api_buttons that fire a configured
HTTP call (full verbs + headers + body) when an authorized member presses
them, through the same hardened egress (now shared between callDoor and the
new callApi). Each button carries a required_permission (default the new
apicall.invoke code); members see only buttons they may press. Builder at
/door/buttons with a door-template preset; members press from /doors. Every
press is recorded in api_call_log with secrets redacted.
Both subsystems are inert until an admin enables inbound on a connection or
creates a button. 624 unit + 50 integration tests; migrations applied
top-to-bottom in schema.sql; types and docs updated.
Deferred deeper-audit P1. validateDoorTarget only string-checked the
host; a bare fetch did its own DNS resolution, so a hostname could
resolve to 127.0.0.1/169.254.169.254 between check and connect. The
executor now resolves once (dns.lookup all), rejects if ANY resolved
address is blocked (isBlockedDoorIp: loopback/unspecified/link-local/
metadata incl IPv4-mapped IPv6; RFC1918/LAN/ULA allowed since door
controllers live there), then connects to the validated IP literal so
fetch performs no second resolution (TOCTOU closed). Original Host kept
best-effort; redirect:'manual' retained. Dependency-free (no undici
seam). 33 door-logic tests; suite 532.
Every door action bubbled the executor's reason/e.message to the
client; redaction was password-literal + a fixed param-name regex, so a
generic-adapter connection with a custom auth param + verbose upstream
error could surface the secret client-side. Client returns are now a
generic 'controller call failed' message; the redacted detail still
goes to door_access_log for operators. redactDoorSecrets + callDoor
gained an optional authParam (scrub the connection's actual auth param
value regardless of name); threading conn.auth_param through the
door-call selects is a deferred defense-in-depth follow-up (client
leak is fully closed; native HeatSync e= is already regex-covered).
Migration 035 adds door_connections (per-space controller integration:
secret_ref -> AES-256-GCM secrets vault, never a plaintext password;
pinned_host SSRF pin; native_heatsync|generic_http adapter;
allow_member_self_entry opt-in for phase 3) and door_access_log
(append-only, secrets redacted, service-client-only writes; immutable).
RLS additive/default-deny: connections CRUD = door.manage; log SELECT =
door.manage/operate.
Safety core is pure and heavily unit-tested (door-logic, suite 409):
validateDoorTarget (request host must equal the pinned host;
metadata/link-local always blocked; http(s) only), the
firmware-verified HeatSync encoders with fixed-width zero-padding
(slot 3 / perm 3 / tag 8 / 4-char password), generic template
substitution, and redactDoorSecrets. lib/door/executor.ts is the single
hardened egress: re-validates the pin, refuses redirects, caps time and
body, redacts before any audit write. The door password is read from the
secrets vault and decrypted server-side only, never returned or logged.
/door/manage (door.manage) configures connections, picks a vault secret,
and runs a safe status-only test. Sidebar Admin link added; "Learn"
moved before "People" per request. Docs updated.
Moheeb ZaraandClaude Opus 4.8