Deferred deeper-audit P1. validateDoorTarget only string-checked the
host; a bare fetch did its own DNS resolution, so a hostname could
resolve to 127.0.0.1/169.254.169.254 between check and connect. The
executor now resolves once (dns.lookup all), rejects if ANY resolved
address is blocked (isBlockedDoorIp: loopback/unspecified/link-local/
metadata incl IPv4-mapped IPv6; RFC1918/LAN/ULA allowed since door
controllers live there), then connects to the validated IP literal so
fetch performs no second resolution (TOCTOU closed). Original Host kept
best-effort; redirect:'manual' retained. Dependency-free (no undici
seam). 33 door-logic tests; suite 532.
Every door action bubbled the executor's reason/e.message to the
client; redaction was password-literal + a fixed param-name regex, so a
generic-adapter connection with a custom auth param + verbose upstream
error could surface the secret client-side. Client returns are now a
generic 'controller call failed' message; the redacted detail still
goes to door_access_log for operators. redactDoorSecrets + callDoor
gained an optional authParam (scrub the connection's actual auth param
value regardless of name); threading conn.auth_param through the
door-call selects is a deferred defense-in-depth follow-up (client
leak is fully closed; native HeatSync e= is already regex-covered).
Migration 035 adds door_connections (per-space controller integration:
secret_ref -> AES-256-GCM secrets vault, never a plaintext password;
pinned_host SSRF pin; native_heatsync|generic_http adapter;
allow_member_self_entry opt-in for phase 3) and door_access_log
(append-only, secrets redacted, service-client-only writes; immutable).
RLS additive/default-deny: connections CRUD = door.manage; log SELECT =
door.manage/operate.
Safety core is pure and heavily unit-tested (door-logic, suite 409):
validateDoorTarget (request host must equal the pinned host;
metadata/link-local always blocked; http(s) only), the
firmware-verified HeatSync encoders with fixed-width zero-padding
(slot 3 / perm 3 / tag 8 / 4-char password), generic template
substitution, and redactDoorSecrets. lib/door/executor.ts is the single
hardened egress: re-validates the pin, refuses redirects, caps time and
body, redacts before any audit write. The door password is read from the
secrets vault and decrypted server-side only, never returned or logged.
/door/manage (door.manage) configures connections, picks a vault secret,
and runs a safe status-only test. Sidebar Admin link added; "Learn"
moved before "People" per request. Docs updated.
Moheeb Zara